As it did in Alep with the help of Russ­ian forces, the Bachar regime mas­sacres civil­ians and is about to reclaim the rebel enclave of the Ghou­ta in Syria.

This a fact no one can deny. Pro­pa­gan­da will use a pro­fu­sion of images, only to deny evi­dence in the end: those who die are always the pop­u­la­tions attempt­ing to sur­vive in all the cross­fires. But deny­ing a mas­sacre because this serves one’s polit­i­cal vision, with the excuse that pro­pa­gan­da uses it, would be intel­lec­tu­al and polit­i­cal dishonesty.

Recov­er­ing Mossul required a blood bath. Recov­er­ing Raqqa was no bet­ter. In both cas­es, ISIS was respon­si­ble for the death of hostages in its hands: they were civil­ians attempt­ing to sur­vive, used wide­ly as “human shields”. In the case of Raqqa, while the SDF nego­ti­at­ed the final lib­er­a­tion in order to avoid use­less deaths on both sides, we can­not for­get his some went as far as to accuse them of “com­plic­i­ty with ISIS”.

But who can have the cyn­i­cism of assim­i­lat­ing pop­u­la­tions held hostage, even com­plic­it by neces­si­ty at times, with ISIS. Where, in the case of Raqqa and of Mosul, would the “lib­er­a­tors” have found the pop­u­la­tion that would form the base of the new admin­is­tra­tion on the premis­es, with­out the sup­port of civil­ians who had been sub­ject­ed to the igno­minies, or had tol­er­at­ed them? No one then assim­i­lat­ed the pop­u­la­tions to their per­se­cu­tors, because it was a mat­ter of replac­ing death with life and a future in need of building.

It should be like­wise for the pop­u­la­tions in the Ghouta.

But the pol­i­cy of the Bachar regime and of Rus­sia has noth­ing to do with the polit­i­cal strat­e­gy for Raqqa and the zones lib­er­at­ed from ISIS. Bachar’s pol­i­cy is a mil­i­tary pol­i­cy of crush­ing and anni­hi­lat­ing, even though every­one knows there is noth­ing rev­o­lu­tion­ary left in this enclave, only pow­er games on the backs of those forced to take sides or die.

Accept­ing anoth­er vision and oppos­ing what is going on fur­ther north in Syr­ia in Afrin to what would be “pseu­do, pro­pa­gan­da mas­sacres” in the Ghou­ta is not only igno­ble and cyn­i­cal, but it does not allow an under­stand­ing of the sit­u­a­tions of the ones and of the oth­ers, of the alliances and counter-alliances of inter­ests between region­al and inter­na­tion­al powers.

For years, war on the Syr­i­an soil has brought its load of deaths, exac­tions, destruc­tions, rapes, bro­ken lives and exiles.   Widen­ing the view to the whole of Mesopotamia and Turkey in its present con­for­ma­tion would increase the num­bers even more, all mask­ing unbear­able real­i­ties and new frac­tures in the human future on these territories.

List­ing the name of the peo­ples and keep­ing a grue­some account­ing between them would be adding yet more to the unspeakable.

Let us put in its prop­er per­spec­tive the sud­den hyp­o­crit­i­cal inter­est for the Ghou­ta dis­played by West­ern gov­ern­ments, the very same ones who greet Erdoğan as their part­ner and who, no lat­er than yes­ter­day, were still request­ing sim­ple “restraint” in Afrin.

This is the pur­suit of a polit­cy that would not accept that Syr­ia, freed of its tyrants and mul­ti­ple Jihadist mur­der­ers, gov­ern itself autonomous­ly for it’s own sake, in demo­c­ra­t­ic fed­er­a­tions of its peo­ples, all the oppo­site of the cur­rent rot­ting and mur­der­ous Nation-State.

These same gov­ern­ments have sup­port­ed diplo­mat­i­cal­ly and through mil­i­tary means what now pro­vokes laugh­ter when it calls itself “free”. These same gov­ern­ments have allowed an armed Islamist counter rev­o­lu­tion in Syr­ia that dis­possed the ini­tia­tors of the anti-Bachar Spring. And already, at that moment, they sup­port­ed Turkey, an impor­tant ele­ment in the civ­il war.

These same gov­ern­ments used the fight­ers of North­ern Syr­ia like canon fod­der against ISIS, with­out ever accept­ing their polit­i­cal project.

So the Ghou­ta is a reveal­er of the cyn­i­cal alliances of inter­ests, and of the con­fronta­tion of nation­al­ist wills at the region­al level.

The North­ern Syr­i­an Demo­c­ra­t­ic Fed­er­a­tion attempts to insert its strat­e­gy into this imbroglio and thus becomes hard to understand.

Call­ing on the Syr­i­an Nation to defend the bor­ders of Syr­ia against the inva­sion of Turk­ish forces and its beard­ed accom­plices, while reaf­firm­ing a project total­ly con­trary to Bachar’s Syr­ia, plays on such con­tra­dic­tions that it opens itself to every simplication…

No, this is not the Ghou­ta against Afrin.
No, this is not Bachar against Erdoğan.
No, this is not the Kurds against all the oth­er peoples…

The SDF and the PYD have demon­strat­ed they could defeat a NATO army’s project of pen­e­trat­ing deeply into Syr­ia and anni­hi­lat­ing the demo­c­ra­t­ic con­fed­er­al­ist project in the North.

The strat­e­gy of the “Coali­tions” was to let things hap­pen, so as to clar­i­fy the roles and places of each, tak­ing the oppor­tu­ni­ty to dis­solve  the polit­i­cal ben­e­fits accrued in the mil­i­tary vic­to­ries against ISIS and the main fight­ing force. This strat­e­gy turns out to be unsucess­ful due to the resis­tance in Afrin.

Let’s not imag­ine these strate­gies as plots decid­ed around tables, even though they were dis­cussed at meet­ings we could mention.

The mil­i­tary defeat of ISIS, the win-win agree­ments between Europe and Turkey con­cern­ing migrants, the tem­po­rary shoring up of the regime in Bag­dad, and the back-ped­alling on the Ira­ki Kur­dish auton­o­my, the vic­to­ry of Turk­ish islamo-nation­al­ism on its Kur­dish pop­u­la­tions in the East, after three years of mas­sacres… The pre­dom­i­nant role tak­en on by Rus­sia and its Iran­ian allies in the pos­si­ble out­come, fol­low­ing the export on the premis­es of a mil­i­tary strat­e­gy… All pro­vide explic­it ele­ments of the present sit­u­a­tion, to which must be added the ambiva­lence and vari­abil­i­ty of the Amer­i­can pol­i­cy, as well the as Gulf’s involve­ment in domes­tic mil­i­tary operations…

The whole of these ele­ments, tak­en one by one, are enough to express the present con­tra­dic­tions. And in a war, these con­tra­dic­tions are sources of oppor­tu­ni­ties for alliances of inter­ests. As an exam­ple, Erdoğan’s is the eas­i­est illus­tra­tion available.

The arrival of Syr­i­an mili­tias in Afrin is one of those con­tra­dic­tions. The PYD and the SDF’s gam­ble of exploit­ing it at the polit­i­cal and the mil­i­tary lev­el is risky for the future. What is here a pro­pos­al for a tem­po­rary alliance of inter­ests rests on the pop­u­lar, human, polit­i­cal and con­fed­er­al force that welds togeth­er the defense in Afrin. All the dec­la­ra­tions issu­ing from the North­ern enti­ty show the will to move one piece for­ward on the chess­board with­out giv­ing an inch polit­i­cal­ly on their pro­pos­als for the future, thus back­ing Rus­sia up against its ambivalences.

When I see blos­som­ing here and there analy­ses on the neces­si­ty for the Kurds to advance with Bachar from here on, because he is Turkey’s best ene­my, I tell myself that Kur­dish nation­al­ism (which still exists out in real­i­ty) is sol­u­ble in Syr­i­an nation­al­ism until the next con­fronta­tion and that, decid­ed­ly, the media smoke­screens have done a good job of prepar­ing total incom­pre­hen­sion of the most absolute and sim­plis­tic kind, so dear to nation­alisms of all stripes.

Why should we ana­lyze, write, say the oppo­site of what we ana­lyzed, wrote and said yes­ter­day because, appar­ent­ly forced to mod­i­fy the rules of the on-site alliances, and more than ever, the enti­ty in North­ern Syr­ia is attempt­ing to save Afrin and its polit­i­cal project?

A polit­i­cal project that does not accom­mo­date itself to Bachar, nor to his ongo­ing mas­sacres in the Ghou­ta. The oppo­site is true, human­ly and in polit­i­cal terms. 

 Uncon­di­tion­al sup­port to the fight­ers for free­dom and democ­ra­cy in Afrin! 

Translation by Renée Lucie Bourges

Syrie • Deux poids deux mesures est inac­cept­able Cliquez pour lire

Vous pouvez utiliser, partager les articles et les traductions de Kedistan en précisant la source et en ajoutant un lien afin de respecter le travail des auteur(e)s et traductrices/teurs. Merci.Kedistan’ın tüm yayınlarını, yazar ve çevirmenlerin emeğine saygı göstererek, kaynak ve link vererek paylaşabilirisiniz. Teşekkürler.
Ji kerema xwere dema hun nivîsên Kedistanê parve dikin, ji bo rêzgirtina maf û keda nivîskar û wergêr, lînk û navê malperê wek çavkanî diyar bikin. Spas.
You may use and share Kedistan’s articles and translations, specifying the source and adding a link in order to respect the writer(s) and translator(s) work. Thank you.
Por respeto hacia la labor de las autoras y traductoras, puedes utilizar y compartir los artículos y las traducciones de Kedistan citando la fuente y añadiendo el enlace. Gracias.
Daniel Fleury on FacebookDaniel Fleury on Twitter
Daniel Fleury
Let­tres mod­ernes à l’Université de Tours. Gros mots poli­tiques… Coups d’oeil politiques…