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Ever since the Peo­ples’ Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty’s elec­toral suc­cess in June 2015 the regime has attempt­ed with every means to destroy pop­u­lar sup­port for the Par­ty, as well as the Par­ty itself.

This Kur­dish move­ment chose a polit­i­cal offer for all the peo­ples of Turkey. And it is on this basis that the dif­fer­ent move­ments stem­ming from anti-regime strug­gles of the pre­ced­ing years joined up (See com­plete arti­cle The HDP “Pro-Kur­dish Par­ty” an unbear­able media jin­gle — in French).

The uni­lat­er­al break in nego­ti­a­tions with the Kur­dish move­ment (known as the “res­o­lu­tion process”) inter­vened in 2015. It marked the bru­tal end to a peri­od of over­tures where a few fun­da­men­tal rights could be exer­cised. It announced a peri­od of exac­tions, dis­crim­i­na­tions and repressions.

The con­flict opened in Kur­dis­tan, in east­ern Turkey when the regime massed troops and mili­tias against towns and dis­tricts that had declared their “auton­o­my”, apply­ing de fac­to the demands expressed dur­ing the dis­cus­sions. These dec­la­ra­tions served as the rea­son for declar­ing a state of siege and cur­fews, bomb­ings and the destruc­tion of entire neigh­bor­hoods that resist­ed. These resis­tance strug­gles of 2015 are also known as the “war of trench­es” based ib the exam­ple of the mar­tyred towns and neigh­bor­hoods destroyed by the Turk­ish State. These bloody and mur­der­ous episodes were added on as a sup­ple­men­tary lay­er to the long his­to­ry of oppres­sion of the Kur­dish peo­ple, fol­low­ing on the black decades of 1980 and 1990. This time, the mur­der­ous ele­ment was not Kemal­ist mil­i­tarism but the Erdoğan regime, aid­ed by offi­cers of the Gülen broth­er­hood, who were then accom­plices of the crimes against the Kur­dish populations.

For fur­ther read­ing on this top­ic, you may con­sult Kedis­tan’s archived mate­ri­als of the sec­ond half of the year 2015.

To this police and mil­i­tary offen­sive were added a will to polit­i­cal­ly destroy the HDP which was resist­ing as best it could.

In March 2016, the lift­ing of par­lia­men­tary immu­ni­ty was request­ed for cer­tain elect­ed mem­bers of the HDP Par­ty, among them Sela­hat­tin Demir­taş and Figen Yük­sek­dağ who were then its Co-Pres­i­dents. On Novem­ber 4 2016, the elect­ed mem­bers were arrest­ed, then incar­cer­at­ed. They are still in prison.

Of course, none of this has any­thing to do with the “failed coup d’é­tat” of July 2016. But Erdoğan ful­ly exploit­ed the bonus it pro­vid­ed. And pro­ceed­ed to charge the lead­ers with accu­sa­tions of “ter­ror­ism”, “sep­a­ratism”, “gulenism” , all terms that became of com­mon usage in the regime’s tri­bunals of injus­tice, just as they still are nowadays.

In 2016, numer­ous HDP offices were attacked by ultra­na­tion­al­ists. These attacks are still occur­ring sporadically.

In this year of 2020, after the HDP has man­aged to main­tain its pop­u­lar sup­port in the elec­tions of the pre­vi­ous five years, despite the “blood­let­ting” imposed on it, the regime has fur­ther accen­tu­at­ed these polit­i­cal and repres­sive offensives.

A num­ber of mem­bers and lead­ers of the HDP are in prison or in a con­stant back and forth in and out of it. To this day, 73 HDP may­orl­ties have found them­selves placed under gov­ern­men­tal admin­is­tra­tors fol­low­ing the with­draw­al of the Co-May­ors from their duties, and their arrest.

No lat­er than yes­ter­day, the Min­is­ter of the Turk­ish Inte­ri­or, Süley­man Soy­lu, in a marathon speech to the Nation­al Assem­bly spoke of “devel­op­ments” in dif­fer­ent Kur­dish towns, con­grat­u­lat­ing him­self for action “oh! Oh so well done’ like a school boy, “Oh! Ooooh! The mon­ey isn’t going to the PKK, it is going to the Nation, Oh, oh! We have tak­en back 73 city halls and placed admin­is­tra­tors in them. Take down notes!” he cried with unre­strained rage, “694 years of prison are demand­ed against these may­ors!” … Applause followed…

This 40 minute long speech before the Turk­ish Assem­bly would deserve an arti­cle and a trans­la­tion all its own. Mixed togeth­er, we find in it every pos­si­ble com­bi­na­tion attribut­ing “ter­ror­ism” to the HDP, putting it on an equal foot­ing with the Ital­ian Mafia, the Basque inde­pen­den­tists and the Gold­en Dawn in Greece… Find the mis­take. The com­mon fea­ture HDP+PKK, that great clas­sic, is also trot­ted out, charg­ing the HDP of “crimes”, with a num­ber of pho­tographs, and treat­ing young vic­tims of the repres­sion of “child ter­ror­ists”. Sela­hat­tin Demir­taş whose lib­er­a­tion is demand­ed by the Euro­pean Tri­bunal of Human Right is also labelled as a ter­ror­ist leader. The speech also served to jus­ti­fy all the upcom­ing repres­sion, com­bin­ing “peace and uni­ty of the Nation” and “a unwa­ver­ing strug­gle against the terrorists’.

Already, in June 2020, Kedis­tan spoke in a col­umn of a kind of media embar­go, of the efforts by the ones and the oth­ers to ren­der this pro­gres­sist and demo­c­ra­t­ic par­ty invis­i­ble and inaudi­ble, and of sul­furous whiffs of a desire for its annihilation…

Last Octo­ber 20, with an opin­ion col­umn writ­ten in prison, Sela­hat­tin Demir­taş in per­son denounced “a plot against the HDP on the back of Kobanê”.

Noth­ing sur­pris­ing in this for a State that is no longer under the rule of Law. You already know what we think of States them­selves, but when the one in Turkey becomes a Car­tel regime, no trace of jus­tice can subsist.

For the past few days, there is again a ques­tion of lift­ing the immu­ni­ty of the few remain­ing HDP deputies who are still free… The 29 new requests for the lift­ing of Par­lia­men­tary immu­ni­ty sub­mit­ted recent­ly to the Turk­ish Nation­al Assem­bly’s bureau con­cern oppo­si­tion deputies, essen­tial­ly those elect­ed for the Peo­ples’ Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty (HDP). Indeed, 23 of the requests would sup­press par­lia­men­tary immu­ni­ty for 17 deputies of this par­ty, includ­ing its Copres­i­dent Mithat Sancar.

From left to right: Ayşe Sürücü (1 request), Berdan Öztürk (2), Felek­nas Uca (2), Garo Pay­lan (1), Gülüs­tan Kılıç Koçy­iğit (1), Habip Eksik (1),Hişyar Özsoy (2), Hüseyin Kaç­maz (1), İmam Taşçıer (2), Mer­al Danış Beş­taş (1), Mithat San­car (1), Murat Sarısaç (1), Nuran İmir (3), Ömer Faruk Gerg­er­lioğlu (1), Ömer Öcalan (1), Sezai Temel­li (1), Tayip Temel (1).

* * *

We have cho­sen here to trans­late and to present a sum­ma­ry of a report from 2015. This report antic­i­pates the ongo­ing repres­sion, and states the rea­sons for it, on top of the anti-Kur­dish nation­al­ist racism under­ly­ing the regime and the pol­i­cy of its coali­tions of interests.

This “Kur­dish Report” was estab­lished in Sep­tem­ber 2015 by the SETA Foun­da­tion, a think tank close­ly linked to the AKP.

Before look­ing at it, a bit of information:

What is SETA?

The SETA Foun­da­tion, in Turk­ish, “Siyaset, Ekono­mi ve Toplum Araştır­maları Vak­fı” and in Eng­lish the “Foun­da­tion for Polit­i­cal, Eco­nom­ic and Social Research” is a polit­i­cal “think tank” based in Ankara. With one click one learns on Wikipedia that the group was cre­at­ed in 2006 in order to pro­duce “knowl­edge and up-to-date and pre­cise analy­ses in the areas of pol­i­tics, the econ­o­my and soci­ety” and “to inform deciders and the gen­er­al pub­lic on the evo­lu­tion of polit­i­cal, eco­nom­ic, social and cul­tur­al con­di­tions”. Burhanet­tin Duran has served as its gen­er­al coor­di­na­tor since 2014. On its “about” page which has dis­ap­peared from their web­site (but you can find an archived copy here), the group describes itself as “inde­pen­dent, non-prof­it and non-par­ti­san” but it is described by Deutsche Welle as being con­trolled by Pres­i­dent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The foun­da­tion has offices in Istan­bul, Wash­ing­ton D.C. and Cairo, and pro­duces a uni­ver­si­ty news­pa­per about Turkey: Insight Turkey.

Some of SETA’s cur­rent and for­mer mem­bers are also high-rank­ing civ­il ser­vants of the Erdoğan pres­i­den­tial sys­tem, colum­nists for pro-AKP media. İbrahim Kalın, SETA’s found­ing direc­tor, is now Erdoğan’s main advi­sor and spokesman since 2014. He was a colum­nist for Sabah, the main pro-AKP news­pa­per. Anoth­er name that might sound famil­iar is that of Fahret­tin Altun. He was men­tioned in one of the recent arti­cles in Kedis­tan, one that relayed incred­i­ble rev­e­la­tions, straight out of the email of Berat Albayrak, Erdoğan’s son-in-law and Finance Min­is­ter — recent­ly ex in the lat­ter case… Fahret­tin Altun is SETA’s for­mer gen­er­al coor­di­na­tor for Istan­bul and deputy gen­er­al coor­di­na­tor for SETA, and now chief of pres­i­den­tial com­mu­ni­ca­tions. He was also a colum­nist at Sabah. Burhanet­tin Duran, SETA’s gen­er­al coor­di­na­tor is also a mem­ber of the Pres­i­den­tial Secu­ri­ty and For­eign Pol­i­cy Coun­cil and a colum­nist for Sabah. Muham­met Müc­ahit Küçükyıl­maz, for­mer com­mu­ni­ca­tion coor­di­na­tor for SETA is now prin­ci­pal advi­sor to Recept Tayyip Erdoğan and…columnist for Sabah. Hat­ice Kara­han, who does eco­nom­ic research for SETA is now eco­nom­ic advi­sor to the Reis and a chron­i­cler for the rag at the regime’s ser­vice, Yeni Şafak.

In ear­ly July 2019, SETA pub­lished a 202 page report titled “Exten­sions of Inter­na­tion­al Media in Turkey” which caused a huge con­tro­ver­sy in Turkey and abroad. The report pro­vid­ed indi­vid­ual names and pro­fes­sion­al back­grounds of Turk­ish jour­nal­ists work­ing in the Turk­ish branch­es of insti­tu­tions such as Euronews, BBC, Deutsche Welle, Voice of Amer­i­ca, Sput­nik, CRI and The Inde­pen­dent… In this report, SETA also pro­vid­ed sam­ples of shares by jour­nal­ists on their per­son­al accounts on social net­works, dis­play­ing them and accus­ing these mem­bers of the press of anti-gov­ern­men­tal bias. Unions and jour­nal­ist asso­ci­a­tions con­demned the report.

If you now have a gen­er­al idea of SETA, let’s go back fur­ther in time. Because our top­ic is the “Kur­dish Report” from 2015…

What does the “Kurdish Report” say?

This 64 page report observes and advis­es: “There must be put an end to the res­o­lu­tion process”, “an inter­ven­tion is nec­es­sary on the rise in Kur­dish nation­al aware­ness”, “the Pres­i­dent of the Republics’ poli­cies alien­ate the Kurds”, “the pol­i­cy barons are present at the heart of the AKP”…Every­thing is there.

The com­plete report is found as an attach­ment to an email received in Berat Albayrak’s email which was pirat­ed and made avail­able to pub­lic opin­ion on Wik­ileaks. You can also see the doc­u­ment in Turk­ish in pdf for­mat HERE.

SETA/FIELD REPORT
ON THE POSSIBLE DYNAMIC OF THE KURDISH VOTE
AT THE NOVEMBER 1st 2015 ELECTIONS
(Diyarbakır, Urfa, Adıyaman, Antep, Mersin, Muş, Bitlis, Van, Bingöl, Ağrı, Erzurum, İstanbul, Ankara, Kocaeli, Bursa, İzmir) September 7–15 2015

■ Dur­ing the June 2015 elec­tions, the fall in Kur­dish votes and those of the young received by the AKP Par­ty reached notice­able lev­els. (Page 2)

■ It was noticed that, with the rise in Kur­dish iden­ti­ty, the AKP’s ser­vice pol­i­cy and its speech on uni­ty based on reli­gion have lost their influ­ence in the region. (Page 6)

■ It was observed that local rep­re­sen­ta­tives of the AKP give an image of “a Par­ty for the rich, for the elite”. (Page 6)

■ The peo­ple with whom inter­views were con­duct­ed, stat­ed the dom­i­na­tion of a group defined as “polit­i­cal barons” in the AKP’s local struc­tures. Accord­ing to these state­ments, the peo­ple influ­en­tial in the towns’ orga­ni­za­tion attempt to con­trol the town’s polit­i­cal and eco­nom­ic poli­cies and obtain polit­i­cal advan­tages from them. (Page 7)

■ The pos­si­bil­i­ty of keep­ing the Kurds by the side of the AKP or of the gov­ern­ment with the “way of doing pol­i­tics” adopt­ed by the Pres­i­dent of the Repub­lic has become dif­fi­cult, this is expressed unan­i­mous­ly. (Page 8)

■ As the Kurds have a tra­di­tion­al social struc­ture and val­ues, it would be nec­es­sary to con­sti­tute a del­e­ga­tion with­in the AKP, direct­ly linked to the Pres­i­dent of the Repub­lic and, through its inter­ven­tion to estab­lish a close con­tact with the sheikhs, opin­ion lead­ers influ­en­tial on the elec­tors, to build a con­stant dia­logue and con­duct con­sul­ta­tions. (Page 19)

■ The young peo­ple think that only the HDP can offer more, and even more impor­tant­ly that it can offer the most. Among young Kurds, self-con­fi­dence has plateaued. (Page 25)

■ Dur­ing the res­o­lu­tion peri­od, the HDP and the PKK were mas­ters of the field and devel­oped the urban struc­tures very well. A hier­ar­chi­cal struc­ture was set up from cor­po­ra­tive orga­ni­za­tions to col­lege or uni­ver­si­ty ones, this allows a mes­sage sent from above to reach HDP sym­pa­thiz­ers with­in an hour. (Page 25)

■ Young peo­ple gath­er on social net­works around accounts belong­ing to the HDP, thus obtain­ing this infor­ma­tion very quick­ly. In the region, there is no counter-orga­ni­za­tion through social media that can respond to this. (Page 25)

■ Youths that are not HDP sym­pa­thiz­ers are lost. They are aware of the fact that there is some­thing in the dis­cours­es of HDP mem­bers that dis­turbs them emo­tion­al­ly, but they do not have the tools to give mean­ing to this or the courage to express it. (Page 26)

■ When one digs deep­er, it becomes obvi­ous that the res­o­lu­tion process is the true rea­son for the loss of AKP votes in the region. All the alle­ga­tions lead to the fact that the ter­rain is lost. The loss of ter­rain, in secu­ri­ty as well as dis­course and pol­i­tics appears as the source for the loss of votes for the AKP and the suc­cess obtained by the HDP. (Page 26)

■ A feel­ing of free­dom, born from the struc­tur­ing inten­si­fied by the HDP and its exper­tise in mas­ter­ing the region con­nects with the notion of a His­tor­i­cal flow, and adds effi­cien­cy to the elec­torate’s ori­en­ta­tion toward the HDP. (Page 26)

■ The town of Urfa is very well struc­tured. The HDP has spread very well the opin­ion it will suc­ceed and this new sit­u­a­tion is tak­en into con­sid­er­a­tion by the oth­er (local) actors. (Page 27)

■ It is nec­es­sary to spread the idea that the region will not be bet­ter off with­out the AKP. In order to do this, there is the need to gain the upper hand in the dis­course, in pol­i­cy and in secu­ri­ty. The advice is that, if the Kur­dish elec­torate does not ques­tion what the HDP is, the AKP can­not obtain deci­sive con­quests. (Page 27)

■ The PKK-HDP have invest­ed a seri­ous force through the city halls they won at the last elec­tions. It is notice­able that even Kurds who are tra­di­tion­al­ists from a socio-cul­tur­al point of view, and who have a reli­gious iden­ti­ty, lean toward the HDP. (Page 35)

■ In observ­ing this shift of vote from the AKP toward the HDP, in com­par­ing the pro­por­tions and the valid bul­letins, one sees clear­ly that it does not involve a one-time shift but rather a reg­u­lar and sta­ble one. (Page 53)

■ As for the actors on which the AKP attempts to rise in the region, they are as a major­i­ty actors hold­ing eco­nom­ic shares in the State, who have busi­ness rela­tions or who are iden­ti­fied through the State and who, con­se­quent­ly, need the State’s sup­port. More­over, there is need to ques­tion whether these actors have links or not with their soci­ety and a cul­ture that ren­ders them suit­able for polit­i­cal work aimed at soci­ety at large. (Page 54)

■ For the Kurds, Kobanê has almost become a foun­da­tion myth with a very high sym­bol­ic val­ue. One must not for­get that even before the begin­ning of the clash­es, bod­ies of young Kurds were con­stant­ly arriv­ing from Kobanê, and this sit­u­a­tion is seen as an ele­ment in the anti-Kur­dish pol­i­cy of Turkey. (Page 53)

■ Kobanê which pro­vid­ed a trig­ger for the Kurds’ his­tor­i­cal mem­o­ry has served a quick­en­ing of nation­al aware­ness, and the Kurds find them­selves in a process con­sti­tu­tive of a nation. They com­pare them­selves to oth­er nations. More­o­ev­er, in the West, there are expres­sions of “nation­al’ reac­tions toward attacks tar­get­ting the Kurds. (Page 54)

■ Rather than respond­ing to each alle­ga­tion made by the HDP and the orga­ni­za­tion (under­stood to mean the PKK) used for pro­pa­gan­da pur­pos­es, it would be bet­ter to counter-attack, in oth­er words, to go from the defen­sive posi­tion to the attack. ‘Page 55)

■ In the region, local dynam­ics influ­ence the vot­ing rates. Hits (counter-attacks) can be car­ried out in par­tic­u­lar in towns where the orga­ni­za­tion (PKK) has no direct influ­ence. How­ev­er, the essen­tial ques­tion is to inter­vene on the process of nation­al aware­ness, which is still in a devel­op­men­tal phase. (Page 55)

To end the sum­ma­ry, the final words in the report:

■ At this point, the fact of enter­ing a vio­lent envi­ron­ment with the resump­tion of clash­es will have an influ­ence on the elec­toral behav­ior. The mid­dle class and par­tic­u­lar­ly the shop own­ers are dis­turbed by the sit­u­a­tion. A good strat­e­gy based on peace and broth­er­hood, a tem­per­ate dis­course toward the Kurds could move the votes toward the AKP of a sec­tion of the vot­ers who do not want con­fronta­tions, who have eco­nom­ic con­cerns. These are also the results obtained in the inter­view; the fact of estab­lish­ing a bal­ance between the vio­lence and the oper­a­tions, and scenes such as those wit­nessed in Cizre, have a neg­a­tive influ­ence on the shift­ing of votes.

Such then was the state of the reflec­tion of the regime’s occult polit­i­cal advi­sor in 2015…

In 2015, the deci­sion to inter­rupt the “res­o­lu­tion process” which was pre­sent­ed as done for “secu­ri­ty rea­sons” and as a response to “attacks” was indeed already in the works. The will to hold on to pow­er, com­bined with Erdoğan’s already expan­sion­is­tic projects, car­ried the day over the Kur­dish ques­tion. Exit the attempt at con­cil­i­at­ing part of the Kur­dish pop­u­la­tion (on Gülen’s advice). For two rea­sons: Kobanê and the HDP.

The counter attack against the Kur­dish move­ment is already sig­naled in this report. It then began at the mil­i­tary lev­el, the report allows to fol­low the polit­i­cal tracks, with­out know­ing that the “attempt­ed coup d’é­tat” repressed in blood in July 2016 will allow to move on to a pol­i­cy of open repres­sion against the elect­ed mem­bers and the Par­ty, behav­ior ren­dered “accept­able” in the mix-up. We must remind the read­er of the approv­ing role then played by the CHP, main oppo­si­tion par­ty; this was fun­da­men­tal. The anti-Kurd nation­al­ism had come full circle.

So, yes, the “news” these last few days is of the nth wave of counter-attack against the HDP. A wave that will have no more influ­ence on the Euro­pean Union than those of the drown­ing migrants.

And since there was need to talk about it, we might as well pro­vide a bit of con­text, beyond the nec­es­sary indig­na­tion and solidarity.


Translation by Renée Lucie Bourges
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